

# THE CONCEPTION AND CLASSIFICATION OF ART

FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

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In his very suggestive article on "Conceptions and Laws in Æsthetics"\* Professor Kirschmann has pointed out the necessity of defining æsthetic conceptions on the basis of a thorough analysis of the phenomena concerned. The justification of such a demand can be shown not only by the examples which he selects from general æsthetics, but also in the realm of special æsthetics, where the confusing multitude of expressions and distinctions obstructs sure and direct progress towards general knowledge. Thus in the following discussion an attempt is made to contribute, critically and positively, to the elucidation of the question concerning the nature and forms of art. Since art and its branches might also be treated from other standpoints, such as that of the historian or of the technician, it may be stated in advance that the argument will here be confined to considerations from psychologico-æsthetical points of view. Here the products of art will only be dealt with in so far as they are æsthetically observed and judged, and as far as they are subject to the laws, measures and suppositions which scientific æsthetics develops.

\*University of Toronto Studies, Psychological Series, Vol. I, pp. 179 *et seq.*

## I.

### THE CONCEPTION OF ART.

In a proper definition a statement is required of the *genus proximum* and the *differentia specifica*, through which all general and all characteristic attributes of the conception to be defined are determined. Therefore we shall have to examine some widely different definitions of the conception of art and determine whether they satisfy these conditions. In our criticism we shall abide by the prevailing usage of the language (believing that arbitrary deviation therefrom is useless), and by the logical demand that contradiction among the conceptions employed is to be avoided.

1. *Art is the product of genius*—according to Kant and Schopenhauer. In this definition the conception of "the product" is obviously the *genus proximum*, whilst the addition "of

genius" forms the *differentia specifica*. By the characterization of him who has created the product, the work of art is distinguished from other real and possible objects of the same kind. The conception of product is quite appropriate to serve as *genus proximum* for art, since doubtless an attribute which is valid for all art is thereby determined, viz. to be a product, a work of living beings. In this definition it is stated at the outset that art is not found in the same way as we find stars and clouds, mountains and valleys, organisms and minerals; but that it is made, produced by men. On the other hand the *differentia specifica* of the definition proves quite insufficient. (a) If the question be asked whether genius produces nothing but works of art, we must obviously answer no, for Leonardo da Vinci and Dürer, for example, have done scientific work as well. Accordingly a further determination of the products of genius is required to determine unambiguously the limits of art. (b) If the further question be put whether a genius is necessary to produce a work of art, the answer must again be given in the negative. For as a rule this title of honour is reserved for the most important and original of artists, while in the production of works of art more modest talent is also acknowledged. Therefore if our definition is too wide from the standpoint (a), since it does not confine itself to works of art, it is too narrow from the standpoint (b), since it does not include all art. (c) If we try to escape these difficulties by defining genius as an agency in the production of works of art, we fall into the error of a *circulus in definiendo*, using in the definition the conception to be defined.

2. *Art is free activity of the fantasy creating the perfect in form and content*—after Köstlin. Here the *genus proximum* is "action of fantasy," the attributes of which form the *differentia specifica*. There are strong objections to this definition also:—(a) The *genus proximum* must be discredited at once. If all art were mere action of fantasy then the centre of gravity would rest in this action, and not in its product, in which other factors may occur. The objective appearance of art as it presents itself universally would fall into the background, and the determination of the conception would be directed to a primitive stage of its origin. Now, to us who observe and appreciate, art is always manifested

as a finished work, and the inference from the effect to the cause is of acknowledged uncertainty. (b) The *differentia specifica* also cannot be regarded as a happy choice. It may fairly be doubted whether in a portrait a *free* activity of fantasy is present or finds expression. Further, the limitation of art to the perfect in content and form must be rejected as entirely unsuitable. For in accordance with this view there would be no place at all in art for the insignificant and ugly. In the definition of a concept which refers to empirical objects an ideal norm is not applicable as an attribute.

3. In the third place we may group together several definitions, in which the *genus proximum* is the same; for they all apprehend art as representation, though they diverge in their statement of what is represented. They designate representation partly as imitation, partly as repetition. Discarding a special accentuation of this distinction, we arrive at the following six definitions:

*Art is representation—*

- (a) of nature, or sense-perception—according to Plato, Aristotle and Batteux;
- (b) of the passions—according to Dubos;
- (c) of the eternal ideas apprehended through pure contemplation—according to Schopenhauer;
- (d) of ideas of imagination—according to Riegel;
- (e) of the beautiful—according to Shaftesbury, Mendelssohn and Schiller;
- (f) of the infinite, the absolute—according to Schelling and Hegel.

The conception of art as imitation is especially characteristic of antiquity, but obviously imitation was not taken in the strict sense of the word, since poetical description was also included. Batteux, who also says of art that it imitates nature, specifies that a good and selective imitation is meant; while Dubos would speak rather of an image (copy) than of an imitation. Indeed, the narrower meaning of this expression would be valid only for comparatively few works of art, and thus is inappropriate for the *genus proximum*. From the naturalistic standpoint, of course, it is no better. Even though its ideal demand may

be justifiable, there are still, according to its own decree, many things in art which do not satisfy its norm, and we are here in search of only such attributes as may be valid for all given art.

On the other hand, in the assertion that all art is representation lies something manifestly correct. It is based on the observation that all perceptible voluntary actions of living beings mean, express, represent something. This is not only valid for those actions which remain in the bodily sphere, such as language, facial expression and gesture, but also for such as extend their operations into the outer world. The swinging of a bell by the wind expresses in itself nothing, but with a man at the rope it may mean fire. Every voluntary expression of life has an aim and a meaning, and if art is regarded as representation, what is meant is that the work of art has not only been accomplished in the manner of any other event in the sphere of inorganic nature, through causal mechanism, according to necessary laws, but also that it is competent to mean, to express something which in itself is independent of the causal connection of its origin.

Whilst we are able to ascribe to the *genus proximum* of this definition a good and useful meaning, it is not so with the *differentia specifica*. In one form of it we are strangely confronted with the assertion that the infinite or the absolute is represented in art. Without detailed comment this statement can certainly not be understood, and even with comment it forms rather an ideal, an aim, than an unprejudiced determination of the characteristics of art. Similarly the definition by Schopenhauer is based on a metaphysical presupposition, which implies the connection with a peculiar philosophical system. With the non-acceptance of the metaphysics, the general validity of the definition disappears. Much too narrow on the other hand are the limitations (a), (b) and (d). Sense, perception, imagination, passion, all can be represented in art, and therefore none can be used to the exclusion of the others as *differentia specifica*.

The nearest approach to the actual facts is given in definition (c). It is true, the conception of the beautiful is by no means

unambiguous. If we understand by it, the pleasant, perhaps even with reference to the direct factor of the æsthetic impression, then that definition is too narrow, for ugliness also obtains in art. But if we make the beautiful to coincide with the æsthetic and thus likewise include the unpleasant, then but a small change is required in order to obtain an approximately satisfactory definition. We need only to speak of *æsthetic representation* in order to describe exactly enough the nature of all art. However, there remains even in this statement a difficulty. By accentuating in the conception of representation the symbolical or sign-nature of the works of art, the fact remains unconsidered that nature must also be regarded from this point of view. By the German word "Einfühlung" has been denoted that process which occurs when we find life, sentiments, forces, expressed or represented in any phenomena whatsoever—not merely in those of art. Every æsthetic impression as such, found or created, is thus capable of suggesting meanings and imparting animation. Therefore the modified definition (*e*) appears too wide, or at least is liable to be misunderstood. In other words the accentuation lies, not in that art represents something, but rather in that it is a product of intentional activity. So we return to the *genus proximum* of the first definition; but the *differentia specifica* can obviously alone be found in the particular properties of the product, *i.e.* in its æsthetic nature. Thus finally we arrive at the definition: *Art is æsthetic product*. But as *genus proximum* we might also employ the conception of the æsthetic impression; though it must be particularly determined through the conception of production. Hence is obtained a definition the converse of the preceding one: *Art is produced æsthetic impression\**. That which forms the *genus proximum* in this was *differentia specifica* in the former definition. The conceptional elements, the attributes, are in both definitions the same; they differ only in their logical position. The second definition is preferable since it renders feasible a simple co-ordination of nature and art within the frame of æsthetics.

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\* I cannot here enter into a more exact determination of the conception of æsthetic impression, and therefore refer the reader to *Vierteljahrsschrift für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Vol. xxiii, p. 154.

## II.

## THE RELATION OF ART TO KINDRED PHENOMENA.

On the basis of the definition developed in the foregoing section, relations are to be assumed, first, to nature, second, to science and to art industry or artisan activity. With the first it has in common the attribute of being æsthetic impression; with the second that of being a creation, a product of human, voluntary action.

*I. The relation of art to nature.* All those æsthetic impressions which are not made or produced belong to the great circle of that which has become, or has naturally arisen, *i.e.* to nature. Thus nature and art divide among themselves the whole realm of the æsthetic with regard to the compass and quantity of that which it presents. Nature certainly exceeds art. That which human hand has brought forth shrinks before the boundless magnitude and abundance of the world as we find it. How powerless appears the painter in comparison with the beaming light which each day brings, filling the widest spaces with innumerable contrasts from bright to dark, with inexhaustible richness of colour-tone, from the deepest to the faintest! How weak appears the musician, even in his grandest compositions, compared with the prodigious gradations of timbre and intensity which the acoustic phenomena in living and inorganic nature present to us at the sea-shore and in the forest, on the mountains and in the valleys, in city and country, above us and below us! What poet has words enough to mirror the various facts of nature, from the inflexible regularity of the inorganic world to man's freest and finest sentiments and emotions! Out of the endless continuity of the temporal course of events, formative art selects one moment; the painter gives up depth and the sculptor colour.

Indeed, from this standpoint art appears only as a limited section of the table of possible æsthetic impressions, one mean patch on the gorgeous garment of the beautiful world. But, as man rises morally above nature, of which, quantitatively considered, he is merely an infinitesimal fraction; as he theoretically encompasses her with formulæ, measures, conceptions and laws

—practically governing her ; so also can he successfully compete with her as an artist. Art, then, is only at a disadvantage as compared with Nature, when it tries to reach her by imitation—to counterfeit reality. Since such a procedure, demanded injudiciously by Naturalism, must be called aesthetically quite unimportant, even irrelevant, it is quite conceivable that art from a purely æsthetic consideration may surpass nature. If the points in which nature shows herself so rich and great are not essential to the æsthetic effect, but are to a large extent irrelevant or even disturbing, then art may enter into competition with nature and may excel in more than one respect.

(a) Art has at its command the *greater purity of æsthetic effect*. It is, according to its nature and purpose, only æsthetic impression, and where there are other additional problems and intentions, as in architecture or art industry, the tendency at least prevails to bring the two into harmony with each other and thus exclude unaesthetic production. In nature, on the other hand, the property of being æsthetic impression is, so to speak, incidental ; it is only one moment, and that often not a prominent one. Not in order to please has nature become so and not otherwise, but according to inviolable laws it forms a causal order which only occasionally we adapt or find adapted to the contemplation of æsthetic apprehension. How often we meet with ugliness in nature ! And when we speak of beauty it is mostly on the ground of an "Einfühlung" and borrowing, which transforms for us the raw sense impression into a pleasing one, aesthetically applicable. With all kinds of more or less fantastic additions we enrich Nature and thereby render her desirable and capable of satisfying us aesthetically. The predominating part in her is and remains the theoretical and practical meaning—the whole army of counteracting forces which we try to grasp, to understand, and to force into our service. It is only in interludes of quiet reverie that we turn to nature for our contemplative values.

Quite different is art, which owes its existence to the artist, and which he has created purely to satisfy æsthetic wants. In the presence of works of art our thought and will are transformed into contemplation ; and this is the proper function of a



work of art. Through the medium of the work perceived we receive the ideas and thoughts of the artist, which do not allow our fancy to have free play, as does nature. The aesthetic in the work of art presents itself to us separated from all disturbing and confusing accessories, from all extraneous meaning and problems. There are no æsthetic adiaphora in it, or at least there should be none. The connection of all constituents is not determined by causal, but by æsthetic points of view. In this the artist has free choice with regard to his subject. Even where he appears to imitate, where he represents a part of nature, every constituent is not of equal value, and he executes, as Batteux expresses it, "a selective imitation."

(b) But we may grant to art *the richer æsthetic effect* also in a certain sense. The imagination of the artist is capable of creating that which does not exist in nature, which perhaps even could not exist. The whole realm of sorcery, tradition and fairy tale, of the mythical and the mystical, is open to art, be it poetic or formative. Where in nature are found all those bold and free subjects of ornamentation in which decorative art deals so lavishly? Where in nature arises the artistic yet useful structure which we admire in lofty cathedrals, sumptuous palaces, or monuments? Where, finally, does nature offer us such music as that of our concerts and operas, that harmonious and melodious complication of tones and timbres, which so intimately excites our emotions and so manifoldly inspires our imagination? Many things in nature, as plant and animal forms in ornamentation prove, may have had an influence on the origin of works of art; other things, such as caves and grottoes, may suggest architectonic art. But a real model for art they do not form. Even though all the elements of form and content which are to be found in the productions of the artist may be met with in nature, nevertheless the combinations into which the artist's hand unites them, are characteristic of art; and it is these combinations that determine the total æsthetic impression, thus attaining the peculiar effects which secure to art an advantage over nature. Another source for the greater riches of artistic effect is to be found in that fact which I have else-

where\* more particularly discussed under the name of "Æsthetic Justice." This manifests itself in the fact that non-aesthetic values, positive and negative, and even the ugliness of realities, may in artistic representation become objects of pleasure, and thus be transformed into contemplative values. On this uniformity rests a far-reaching advantage of art over nature.

(c) There is another point of view which plays an important rôle in art, but is not applicable to nature, namely, *the greater or lesser perfection of the execution*. In nature everything is as it *is*, everything is perfect in its way. In art, on the other hand, the representation of natural objects, of ideas, sentiments, etc., may of course be more or less successful. Here the content, apart from the form which the artist has given to it, is in itself accessible to us, and the artist's intentions can be guessed. Hence we may compare intention with execution, and also imagine other forms than those selected. This affords an essential contribution to the aesthetic judgment of a work of art, for the execution may please or displease us independently of the subject represented. In this the mere technical means and their applications are of no consequence; such, for instance, as the mechanics of musical instruments, the laws of harmony, the rules of poetic structure, the prescriptions for the preparation of pigments or the production of intensity contrasts. All these belong to a purely technical judgment of the work of art, which can be exercised only by those few who are rendered competent critics through special study and experience. But artistic representations may be judged even apart from technical considerations. We may find a certain musical composition poor in form and void of expression; we may criticise a picture for the harshness of its contrasts; we may think a piece of sculpture stiff; we may censure a poem for its prolixity; and all this without entering into the technical origin of their defects, or the possibility of their remedy. Thus in this direction also art presents to aesthetic judgment a new and varied field of operation.

(d) Finally, since art is a product of human voluntary action, *much stricter demands* are made upon it than upon nature. The most improbable, the most undignified, is accepted

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\**Preussische Jahrbücher*, vol. 98, pp. 264 *et seq.*

of nature, because we are permeated with the conviction that her invariable and inviolable laws have been the cause. The rare, the individual, the abnormal, stand on the same level with regard to necessary conditions as the commonplace, the average, the matter of everyday occurrence. That of which the origin and past are not known compels an acknowledgment of its necessity, quite as much as that of which the course and conditions are sufficiently investigated and made manifest. It is wholly different in art. That which art brings forth is not required to justify itself by recurring also in nature. For every æsthetic impression is pleasant and satisfactory when it is in itself a unity and not dependent for effect upon outside factors. That which is represented in art must therefore of itself appear possible and probable; it must bear in itself the stamp of truth. Art has not been a storehouse of curiosities and abnormalities, but has always been the exponent of typical features. For this same reason accident is prohibited in art. Where the individual, the abnormal, is represented, a circumstantial apparatus of explanatory events must be introduced which makes the peculiarities appear necessary. Thus everything essential in art must be propagated from internal laws. We are dissatisfied when the catastrophe of a novel or drama is not the natural conclusion from the contrivances and developments in the plot, situations and characters, but is brought about by some sudden, natural event or by the accidental interference of third persons. For this reason so-called dramatic music, which acquires the regularity of its progress from its adaptation to a text, has an æsthetically incomplete effect if performed apart from the stage or without the accompanying text.

2. *The relation of art to art industry and science.* The æsthetic difference between nature and art can be reduced throughout to the simple idea that the latter is a product of human volition, an intentionally created æsthetic impression. On the other hand, with regard to the second form of our definition of art, in which the attribute "to be a product" forms the *genus proximum*, the conception of "æsthetic impression" is characteristic of the distinction between art and other products.

(a) Art industry, or the product of the artisan, not the artist, which in popular parlance is sometimes accepted as a kind of art, comes under the heading of the useful, and thus serves practical demands only. The ends of art and of art industry are therefore entirely different in principle, and æsthetic satisfaction is not necessarily expected from the artisan's work. But the two are not mutually exclusive. They may combine and form what is called artistic workmanship. In this case the work not only satisfies practical demands but also produces an æsthetic impression. Here, as in architecture, this double destination of the same product of the human hand presents neither difficulty nor contradiction. It is not of essential consequence to the nature of art, whether it appears free and self-dependent, or whether it forms only one aspect of a work, which at the same time is adapted and subordinated to other ends. This distinction is not entirely missing even in the other arts. Thus, for instance, a poetical work may please, and at the same time educate, and satisfy ethical demands. Such by-products may be rarer and less prominent in poetic art, but they play nevertheless a not inconsiderable rôle. Hence a classification of the arts under the double heading of free and unfree formation, as has been proposed and employed by E. Von Hartmann\*, is utterly impracticable. It must be always kept in mind that he who criticizes a novel according to the amount of instruction he derives from it, or according to whether good or evil is finally victorious, no more employs an æsthetic standard than he who judges of an artistically carved cabinet according to its cubic contents.

(b) Whilst formative art especially stands in a natural relationship to art industry and handicraft, poetry on the other hand is closely related to science and philosophy. There is no doubt that not only can poetical creations have a scientific value, but also scientific works may produce an æsthetic effect. Works such as Freytag's *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* and Macaulay's *Essays* give both instruction and pleasure. Such a concurrence of both interests is possible, and even inevitable,

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\* See his *Æsthetics*, Vol. ii, pp. 586 *et seq.*

since philosophy and science make use, in their representation, of the same material as poetry. Nevertheless their laws and aims remain essentially different. The task of science prescribes for its representations on the one hand obedience to rules of logic, and on the other hand—where empirical facts are depicted—reliable truth in the description. In addition there are certain didactic requirements which are satisfied by suitable grouping of the material, and the selection of comprehensible expression. Hence clearness, precision, exactitude, logical coherence are the demands to be satisfied in scientific works. Doubtless there may be works which comply with these rules without producing a pleasant impression. For this reason there may arise here, as in art industry, the desire to have the aesthetic craving satisfied also, as far as possible, without detriment to the scientific ends. Conversely, it is natural that the work of art may fulfil scientific demands, and inculcate certain scientific truths. But no matter how closely these two points of view may be combined, they remain nevertheless two modes of consideration of the same object, essentially different and distinctly separable.

Hence our definition of art has stood the test in a two-fold direction. We may, therefore, unhesitatingly accept it as a basis for a classification of the fine arts. But in this task also we shall proceed by criticism of the many previous attempts to establish a system of art.

### III.

#### CLASSIFICATION OF ART.

The individual kinds, which can be subordinated to the general conception of art are easily enumerated. But even in early times a desire arose to furnish, beyond mere enumeration, a classification, that is, a grouping according to logical points of view. Only in this way a system could be obtained which should characterize the individual fine arts as representatives of certain logical possibilities, and which should reveal the inner reason for their separation. A further effect of such classification would be to enable us to conceive the manifoldness of the

different forms as necessary and at the same time warrant the completeness of the classification.

The division of a generic conception, as accepted, is accomplished by differentiating one attribute of it, the so-called principle of classification. This procedure may be continued with the species thus obtained so that these again are divided into individual forms. Since the first differentiation determines those that follow, it must be kept in mind, in the following discussion, as the gravitation point. The other logical rules, which are necessary for classification, do not need to be specially emphasized.

In the history of æsthetics, five points of view have chiefly been adopted for the primary division of the conception of art: (1) The *senses*, which mediate the perception of the work of art—Batteux, Herder, Hegel, Vischer; (2) The *means of representation* (word, tone, colour, etc.)—Mendelssohn, Sulzer, Kant; (3) The *spacial and temporal form of the phenomenon*—Köstlin, Schasler, Fechner; (4) The *subjects of representation* (the ideas)—Schopenhauer; (5) The *relation of idea to appearance*—Dubos, Home, Schelling, Hegel.

Within these principles of classification occur naturally many other distinctions. Thus, for instance, Herder makes use not only of the two higher senses which he otherwise exclusively employs, but also of the sense of touch, and he refers to it, the plastic art, as the one which forms entire bodies beautifully. As a curiosity we may mention, that there is even an attempt extant to make use of all five senses for a classification of art. In this attempt architecture is attributed to the sense of touch, sculpture to the sense of taste, painting to the sense of smell, music to the sense of hearing, and poetry to the sense of sight. The name of the fortunate discoverer of these relations is Erhard, and the effusion in which he announces them appeared in 1826. Hegel and Vischer do not carry out consistently their principle of classification—for they assume, besides the fine arts for eye and ear, a fine art also for fancy and imagination, namely poetry.

Within the third principle of division, the decisive part is played by the distinction of rest and motion, of simultaneous and successive phenomena, of spacial and temporal formation.

From the second point of view Mendelssohn and Sulzer have advocated as a first sub-division the well-known separation of fine arts and fine "sciences" (*beaux arts*—*belles lettres*), tracing back the former to the natural symbols of that which is to be represented (colour, body, tone), and the latter to artificial or arbitrary symbols (words). Kant on the other hand puts in contra-position the three means of expression, word, gesture and tone, and thus deduces speaking arts, formative arts, and the arts of the play of sentiment.

With regard to the last of the above-mentioned principles, a question arises as to what is to be considered the prototype of the phenomenon. According to Dubos, the emotions and passions are expressed in a work of art, and the arts are classified according to the immediateness and vivacity with which they reproduce their subjects. Music, therefore, stands first, painting takes a middle position, and the weakest and most indirect is the representation of the passions in poetry. Home, on the other hand, makes the relation of art to nature the criterion. Accordingly he distinguishes an art which merely beautifies nature (*horticulture*), then imitative arts (*painting and sculpture*), and finally creative arts, tied to no natural model (*architecture, poetry and music*). Schelling proposes a real and an ideal series of arts according as the reality of the phenomenon or the idea prevails; among the former he reckons music, painting, and sculpture, and among the latter lyric, epic, and dramatic poetry. Hegel, finally, finds a preponderance of phenomenon over idea in symbolic art (*architecture*), an equilibrium of the two in classical art (*sculpture*), and a preponderance of idea over phenomenon in romantic art (*music, painting and poetry*).

We may prepare the way for our criticism of these attempts at classification by simplifying the preliminary system. First, it is clear that among the attributes comprehended in the conception of art, only that of "æsthetic impression" has undergone a differentiation. Not a single one of the above-mentioned principles of classification goes back to the conception of product. Now, we distinguish in the æsthetic impression two factors, the direct and the associative,\* of which the former points

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\*Compare my essay cited above (in *Vierteljahrschrift für wissensch. Philos.* xxiii, 184).

to the sensational side of the phenomenon, and the latter to the associated presentations. Accordingly the three first principles of classification may be grouped under the head of the direct factor, whilst the fourth corresponds to the associative factor, and the fifth expresses the relation between the two. These three principles not only simplify the original scheme, but give at the same time an insight into the possibilities at our disposal. For the conception of product does not furnish a classification according to æsthetic, but according to technical, or other non-æsthetic points of view; and the factors above set forth give a complete primary differentiation of the conception of æsthetic product. Consequently the three new principles of division present an exhaustive list of the possibilities of differentiation which are to be considered with respect to the conception of art in general. Turning now to criticism, we may begin with the conviction that we have before us all æsthetic principles of classification which reasonably could be taken into account.

(a) First, it is clear that the associative factor cannot form the basis of a useful classification of art. For in the first place the manifoldness of the presentations, of the subjects of representation, is so great, even in one and the same work of art, that the latter may have different meanings for different individuals, and thus be variously assigned to one or another kind of art. A "still-life" picture may present as its subject for A a sentiment, for B simply a combination of objects, for C general ideas. In hearing operatic music, one who is acquainted with the whole work may picture to himself the scenes and actions concerned, whilst another who is not acquainted with the opera, if he fancy anything scenic at all, will not go beyond vague images. Is by this difference in the associative factor a difference introduced into the work of art itself? Further, the objects capable of representation by one form of art are so various, that if the principle of classification is to be sought in them, they themselves must needs be divided into different classes. In painting, we meet with landscapes, animals, domestic events, historic scenes, and so on; in poetry we have to cope, so to speak, with everything which can be experienced, thought, or imagined. In spite of these considerable differences



in the associative factor, poetry and painting, according to general agreement, remain undivided forms of art. Thirdly, if one is allowed to find the principle of classification in the subjects of representation, different arts, in so far as they deal with the same subject, would merge into a common class. From this point of view landscape-painting and the poetical description of scenery, the historical picture and the plastic group representing a historical event, passionate music and a lively dance, would be grouped together, in *one* conception. On this principle, therefore, those which naturally belong together are torn apart, and those which should be separated are combined, quite arbitrarily. Schopenhauer, who alone has attempted this classification, does not shrink from co-ordinating architecture and hydraulics, and he gives to both the lowest rank in art, because they represent ideas of the lowest objectivity of the will, viz. gravity, hardness, mobility and so on. Similarly, horticulture and landscape painting, animal painting and animal sculpture are placed side by side. It must be regarded as an inconsistency that poetry is not mentioned. Indeed we cannot wonder that musicians are so enthusiastic for Schopenhauer's philosophy, for they find in his curious system their own art placed at the summit, because it essays to picture will itself, the reality of the world. No such enthusiasm has been manifested by architects. If one did not know that Schopenhauer according to his mode of thinking belongs to the same school of philosophy as Hegel and Schelling, whom he has so unjustly abused, one might recognize it from his classification of art.

(b) The third principle, the relation between the direct and the associative factor, phenomenon and idea, has this decided advantage over the second, that it emancipates itself from the qualitative manifoldness of the associative factor. But even here some objection arises. For, here also may occur considerable individual differences with regard to the same work of art. For one the associative, for another the direct factor may prevail. Does this, then, necessitate an assignment to different types of art? And secondly, works belonging to the same art may be very differently placed with regard to their relation. In music, for instance, Mozart has laid more stress on beauty of

form, Wagner, on the other hand, on expression. Consequently music should not be called simply a romantic art. We find here essentially the same difficulties as with the selection of the associative factor for principle of classification, and they obviously arise just from the participation of this most individual, most subjective and least comprehensible moment.

(c) It follows from what has preceded that only the direct factor can induce a differentiation of the conception of art. Indeed it is the only applicable principle of classification, because it alone presents the objective mediation between the artist and the appreciator, viz. those contents of the work of art which are approximately equal for everybody. Individual taste here finds a limit set to it. The direct factor is the basis and starting-point for all presentative activity, and a ground of agreement for all differences of opinion. This may be the reason why the direct factor has comparatively often, in our first scheme in three different forms, played the decisive rôle for the classification.

(a) Among these three forms the justification of the first—the division according to the senses—must be acknowledged. For certainly there are arts which appeal exclusively to the sense of sight, and others which appeal just as exclusively to the sense of hearing. But it is utterly false to include, with Herder, the sense of touch. The function of the sense of touch may for blind people be æsthetic. Smoothness and symmetry in the space configuration have, through the sense of touch, a pleasant effect on their mind. But from this to an art completely confined to this sense alone is a long step, and under no circumstances should sculpture be regarded as such an art. The assumption of Herder rests on the theory that only the sense of touch furnishes us with a knowledge of the third dimension of space, and thus of solids. It seems that the surprising experiences, which became known at that time, with people born blind, who had undergone successful operation, had cast a too favourable light on the services of the sense of touch.

It is equally inadmissible to place, with Hegel and Vischer, imagination on a par with eye and ear as a receptive faculty, or, so to speak, an inner sense. For poetry, on account of which

this third faculty is introduced, is not directly, but only indirectly, capable of acting upon imagination, viz. through the mediation of one of the senses. But neither do the other arts lack the stimulation of imagination. It is brought into play also in viewing pictures or the products of plastic art. Consequently to imagination a peculiar function for the reception of poetical effect alone cannot be assigned. But a supplementary class of arts, as we may briefly call them, is required ; for there are arts which have an effect on eye and ear at the same time. To these belong drama and opera. Thus we have to add to these two forms of art, a third one, viz. optic-acoustic art.

( $\beta$ ) The second point of view which comes under the conception of the direct factor, that of phenomena of space and time, of the simultaneous and successive, or of rest and motion, could only then properly be combined with the first, if it would admit the introduction of a further differentiation. But this is impossible in the case of acoustic arts. Every art addressed to the sense of hearing contains necessarily the attribute of the successive, thus excluding a purely simultaneous effect. The same is naturally the case in the optic-acoustic arts. Conversely, one may say that succession occurs also in optical arts, but that it has no distinct significance. Thus for instance mimicry, which presents to the eye a succession of gestures, can be regarded as an independent art. But if we were to adopt this standpoint, viz. that of time and space relation, for the chief division, it would be found that for the simple and concrete classification according to the senses we had substituted an abstract principle which it might be impossible to apply throughout without contradiction. Even less suitable appears to me the contraposition of rest and movement. If thereby is understood, according to ordinary usage, a pair of conceptions for which the moment of the spacial process is essential, music and poetry could not be classified at all. One must therefore assign to each a more abstract significance, namely, that of the simultaneous and successive, or that of the permanent and variable, in order to make them universally applicable. But this classification lands us in the same difficulties as have been discussed above.

(γ) On the other hand, in the secondary division, the third point of view, that of the means of representation, can be very well employed, as a natural differentiation of sense impressions. What differentiates painting from sculpture, in the optic, and music from poetry in the acoustic arts, is precisely that which separates, respectively, surfaces from bodies and tones from words, as individual, optic and acoustic contents. Here also occurs the difference between the simple and the mixed, and correspondingly the difference between indivisible and aggregate arts. Thus, every form of art within the third division of each of the three chief groups deals with a combination of the means of expression which serve the other two. We obtain, therefore, the following system :

- A. Optic arts (appealing to the sense of sight) :
  - I. Surface arts, producing works on surfaces :
    - a*, in uncoloured or monochrome execution : Drawing ;
    - b*, in polychrome execution : Painting.
  - II. Solid arts, producing plastic works :
    - a*, in semi-solid form : Relief and Intaglio ;
    - b*, in completely solid form : Sculpture.
  - III. Aggregate arts ; combining surface and plastic effects :
    - a*, Tectonic ;
    - b*, Architecture.
- B. Acoustic arts (appealing to the sense of hearing) :
  - I. Art of tones : Music ;
  - II. Art of words : Poetry ;
  - III. Aggregate art of tones and words : vocal and melodramatic music.
- C. Optic-acoustic arts (appealing to both the higher senses) :
  - I. Art of gestures and tones : Choreographic art ;
  - II. Art of gestures, words and scenery : Drama ;
  - III. Art of gestures, words, tones and scenery : Opera.

We may add to this scheme a few observations. Under the heading " Art of Drawing " we include, as is not unusual nowadays, engraving and etching, xylography, etc., *i.e.* all the arts, no matter how different technically, the products of which with regard to the direct factor consist for the observer in an uncol-

oured or monochromatically treated surface. It may perhaps seem strange that we include under painting the art of making Gobelins and tapestry too. But from an æsthetical standpoint, that is, with reference to the æsthetic impression, the similarity of impression with regard to the direct factor must be decisive for this classification. It is by no means intended to preclude a further differentiation of arts. On the contrary, just where æsthetics ends comes in the dividing activity, the characteristic of production, the technical procedure, and submits the conceptions of the arts of drawing, painting, etc., to further analysis.

That tectonic art and architecture employ and represent both surfaces and solid bodies, treating the former in the manner of surface art, and the latter in the manner of solid art, but at the same time producing out of both a separate unity, scarcely needs explanation. Anticipating, however, a misunderstanding or perhaps even an utterly incorrect apprehension of what is meant by "aggregate arts," we may here emphasize the fact that not surface and solid arts are combined in architecture, but that the means of expression of the two kinds are made to serve a new form of art, which is a unity in itself, and not a combination of other arts. Objection may be taken to including poetry among acoustic arts. Poetry may be read, and thus acts only on the eye. But the direct factor in poetical compositions is never the written or printed text, but the audible word. Rhyme and rhythm play no part for the mere reader. Poetry produces its full æsthetic effect only in audible recitation. The written or printed text represents here, as in music, only a direction, or a system of representative symbols, for the executant, and does not possess an independent or original significance for the æsthetic impression.

For the combination of words and tones in a new aggregate art there is no general term. We include in it not only singing, *i.e.* vocal music, but also "programme music," in so far as it aims at an organic combination of word and tone, and, finally, recitation accompanied by music. In the two latter cases, the interest usually is concentrated more or less on one or the

other side of the combination, thus not permitting a real and complete union as we have it in singing.

In the third group the conception of aggregate art attains decided significance. Consequently, music and poetry can no longer be spoken of as independent forms of art, nor can architecture and formative art, with regard to stage scenery. The means of representation, independently treated and combined in these single arts, form rather the constituents of a comprehensive whole, in which the direct factor assumes a considerably more manifold aspect. It was the mistake of Richard Wagner to see in the totality of the opera merely a fusion of the individual arts, and thus he has built his theory of the opera upon an incorrect basis.

The position of choreographic art in this class is doubtful. For the acoustic impression furnishes in ordinary dancing merely a reliable marking of the rhythm, without claiming the significance of an independent, æsthetic factor. But in the play of motion which we call dancing we can scarcely look for real art. Pantomime and ballet on the other hand appear always in combination with a musical accompaniment to which they belong, and to the evolutions of which they correspond. Only in these two have we the real representatives of choreographic art. Since the rhythm of motion which is essential to them scarcely exists for the mere visual observation, the acoustic supplement is indispensable for the spectator.

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